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ABSTRACT 
  In theory, a complaint is a relatively minor part of a lawsuit, 
intended to initiate the litigation process. In practice, federal courts are 
struggling to implement the Supreme Court’s opinions in Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal. This struggle is 
due, in part, to the fact that neither Twombly nor Iqbal expressly 
overruled the Court’s pre-Twombly pleading jurisprudence. This 
Note focuses on how lower courts are assessing the continued vitality 
of two major pre-Twombly cases: Leatherman v. Tarrant County 
Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit and Swierkiewicz v. 
Sorema N.A. It finds that lower courts are taking conflicting views on 
the status of pre-Twombly precedent and concludes that this discord 
has serious consequences for litigation costs, respect for stare decisis, 
and litigants’ access to justice. 
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I fear that every age must learn its lesson that special pleading cannot 
be made to do the service of trial and that live issues between active 
litigants are not to be disposed of or evaded on the paper 
pleadings . . . . 
 – Judge Charles Clark1 
INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the Supreme Court decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly2 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,3 lower federal courts have struggled 
to figure out exactly what these decisions mean for civil pleading 
standards. Only one thing is clear from Twombly regarding the 
treatment of past precedent: the familiar standard laid out in Conley 
v. Gibson,4 that a motion to dismiss should only be granted if there is 
“no set of facts” to support the plaintiff’s claim, is no longer to be 
employed.5 As the Court noted, this standard “has earned its 
retirement.”6 What remains an important and open question, 
however, is how lower courts should treat the Court’s pre-Twombly 
pleading jurisprudence that has neither been explicitly retired nor 
explicitly overruled. 
The Fourth Circuit recently examined this question in McCleary-
Evans v. Maryland Department of Transportation.7 The case 
illustrates lower courts’ eight-year struggle to reconcile Twombly and 
Iqbal with pre-Twombly authority that remains good law. In 
McCleary-Evans, a divided panel dismissed an employment-
discrimination complaint that relied on Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.8 
to state the applicable pleading standard.9 The court found that, in 
 
 1. Charles E. Clark, Special Pleading in the “Big Case”, 21 F.R.D. 45, 46 (1957). 
 2. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (holding, in relevant part, that a 
complaint must allege facts with enough specificity to state a claim for relief that is plausible, 
not merely conceivable). 
 3. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (clarifying that the plausibility-pleading 
standard announced in Twombly applies to all federal court cases). 
 4. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563.  
 5. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561–63.  
 6. Id. at 563. 
 7. McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep’t of Transp., 780 F.3d 582 (4th Cir. 2015), petition for cert. 
filed, 84 U.S.L.W. 3260 (U.S. Aug. 26, 2015) (No. 15-573). For an in-depth description of this 
case, see infra Part IV. 
 8. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (holding that under Rule 8(a)(2) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need allege only a short and plain 
statement of the claims showing entitlement to relief, rather than establish a prima facie case).  
 9. McCleary-Evans, 780 F.3d at 583–84, 588.  
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light of Twombly and Iqbal, Swierkiewicz had “applied a more lenient 
pleading standard” than required.10 The dissent noted that lower 
courts are devoid of the power to overrule Supreme Court precedent, 
no matter how out-of-vogue these past precedents may seem when 
compared to the Court’s more recent case law.11 
Twombly and Iqbal generated vast amounts of scholarship 
debating the impact these decisions would have on lower courts.12 
These pieces either expressed concern that plaintiffs would be unable 
to survive the pleading stage without access to discovery in cases 
where the defendant has critical information13 or argued that such 
concerns were overblown.14 This debate gave rise to a body of 
literature that assessed Twombly and Iqbal’s (“Twiqbal”) impact 
through empirical data.15 This empirical work has “overwhelmingly 
focused on the question of whether judges have indeed applied a 
 
 10. Id. at 587. 
 11. See id. at 590 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (“[W]e have no authority to overrule a Supreme 
Court decision no matter . . . how out of touch with the Supreme Court’s current thinking the 
decision seems.” (quoting Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014, 1018 (7th Cir. 2002))). 
 12. See generally, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A 
Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2010) (examining what Iqbal 
adds to Twombly’s plausibility pleading and court access); Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards 
After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 135 (2007) (analyzing how the 
Twombly ruling required lower courts to change their pleading jurisprudence); Adam N. 
Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (2010) (addressing the new paradigm 
of pleading following Iqbal).  
 13. Dodson, supra note 12, at 138–39. 
 14. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Twombly and Iqbal Reconsidered, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1621, 
1637–43 (2012). 
 15. See generally, e.g., JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES 6 (2011) (comparing the filing and resolution of motions to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) in twenty-three federal district courts in 
2006 and 2010); Scott Dodson, A New Look: Dismissal Rates of Federal Civil Claims, 96 
JUDICATURE 127 (2012) (assessing the effect of Twombly and Iqbal on dismissals at the 
pleading stage); Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, 101 VA. L. 
REV. 2117 (2015) (analyzing whether Iqbal and Twombly’s new standards have significantly 
changed how motions to dismiss in general are resolved); Jonah B. Gelbach, Note, Locking the 
Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 
YALE L.J. 2270 (2012) (showing how party selection undermined the empirical usefulness of 
simple grant-rate comparisons and provided an alternative analysis by modeling party 
behavior); Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811 (2008) 
(attempting to answer empirically whether federal district courts applying Twombly required 
more from pleadings than they did prior to the decision). 
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higher standard.”16 To answer this question, empirical studies have 
focused on grant rates of 12(b)(6) motions. In other words, they have 
focused on results only. Interestingly, after reviewing these studies, 
Professor Jonah Gelbach claims that “data are unlikely to settle the 
debate over the case-quality effects of the new pleading regime 
ushered in by Twombly and Iqbal.”17 
Rather than focus on outcomes alone, this Note measures 
Twombly and Iqbal’s impact on civil litigation by taking a substantive 
look at lower-court reasoning when testing a claim’s sufficiency. 
Specifically, how do courts treat the conflicting notice-pleading 
standard reaffirmed in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics 
Intelligence and Coordination Unit18 and Swierkiewicz in light of 
Twombly and Iqbal? Analyzing how seventy-four district court cases 
apply these pre-Twombly precedents begins to reveal the impact 
Twombly and Iqbal are having on civil litigation. By looking at these 
opinions’ reasoning, this Note shows that lower courts are taking 
discordant approaches to the status of pre-Twombly precedent. This 
discord has serious consequences for litigation costs, respect for stare 
decisis, and litigant access to the judicial system. 
This Note consists of six parts. Part I provides the context for this 
study by briefly summarizing the history of pleading standards at the 
federal level and tracing the development of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Part II discusses the Supreme Court’s pleading 
jurisprudence and highlights the tension in the case law created by 
both Twombly and Iqbal. Part III describes how the circuit courts 
have treated pre-Twombly precedent and what guidance, if any, this 
treatment provides to district courts. Part IV describes the 
methodology this study employed. Part V shows how district courts 
have treated pre-Twombly case law after Iqbal. Finally, Part VI 
analyzes lower courts’ behavior and calls on the Supreme Court to 
clarify civil pleading standards. 
 
 16. Jonah B. Gelbach, Material Facts in the Debate Over Twombly and Iqbal, 68 STAN. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 1) (on file with author).  
 17. Id. (manuscript at 4). 
 18. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 
(1993). In Leatherman, the Supreme Court considered whether a federal court could apply a 
“‘heightened pleading standard’—more stringent than the usual pleading requirements of Rule 
8(a)” in civil-rights cases. Id. at 164. The Court held that such heightened pleading standards 
were “impossible to square” with the system of “notice pleading” codified by the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Id. at 168. Leatherman is discussed further infra Part II.A.  
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I.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 
A very brief review19 of the historical functions of pleading 
provides the context for this study. It illustrates that remnants of 
these systems, especially in the wake of Twombly and Iqbal, influence 
modern pleading practice. In their simplest form, complaints are the 
documents that state a plaintiff’s claim, put a defendant on notice, 
and prompt the defendant to answer and raise defenses.20 For the first 
century after the American Revolution, pleadings’ key function was 
issue-formulating.21 By the mid-nineteenth century, complaints 
focused on parties stating “material” and “ultimate” facts.22 And in 
the twentieth century, the system emphasized pleading’s “notice” 
function.23 
Common-law pleading was highly technical.24 Under the issue-
forming process, it was the parties’ obligation to narrow their dispute 
down to a “single material point.”25 This process consisted of the 
parties pleading back and forth. The parties would make factual 
allegations and respond by either (1) demurring, challenging the legal 
sufficiency of the claim; (2) accepting the facts alleged, but adding a 
new matter; or finally (3) denying a single material point, forming the 
“single issue” to be resolved at trial.26 The trial would then focus on 
this issue alone. 
 
 19. An in-depth analysis of the development of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is 
beyond the scope of this Note. For a complete historical study, see generally Stephen N. Subrin, 
How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical 
Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987). 
 20. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PROCEDURE 20 (2013).  
 21. See Subrin, supra note 19, at 916 (discussing the common-law pleading procedures 
adopted by the United States after the American Revolution). 
 22. See SCOTT DODSON, NEW PLEADING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 13–14 (2013) 
(describing the confusion caused by the Field Code’s attempt to distinguish between ultimate 
facts, evidentiary facts, and conclusions of law). For further discussion of the Field Code, see 
infra notes 29–34 and accompanying text. 
 23. See Subrin, supra note 19, at 946–47 (quoting Roscoe Pound—one of the architects of 
the modern pleading system—regarding the purpose of notice pleading). 
 24. See id. at 916 (explaining how the early pleading system was designed to resolve a 
single issue).  
 25. CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 4, at 11 (1st ed. 
1928).  
 26. See Subrin, supra note 19, at 916 (detailing the basic procedures of common-law 
pleading); see also DODSON, supra note 22, at 7–8 (discussing the “back-and-forth colloquy” of 
common-law pleadings). 
TESORIERO IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/15/2016  12:30 PM 
1526 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:1521 
Common-law pleading also required plaintiffs to obtain a writ 
that related to the subject matter of the dispute. Writs were “royal 
order[s] which authorised a court to hear a case and instructed a 
sheriff to secure the attendance of the defendant.”27 But because writs 
were “limited to cases where precedents existed,” the types of suits 
that could be brought were highly restricted.28 The requirement of a 
writ, coupled with the fact that a trial on the merits could resolve only 
one issue, created a system fraught with technical difficulties that 
severely limited relief. These issues led to common-law pleading 
being replaced by code pleading. 
The Field Code29 abolished the writ system and combined all 
causes of action into the civil action.30 Under code pleading, a 
complaint was to allege “material” facts and avoid stating “evidential 
facts” and “conclusions of law.”31 Although the code reduced the 
technicalities of pleadings, in practice it proved difficult to distinguish 
between facts, evidence, and conclusions.32 The code thus created a 
“whole new corpus of legal technicality at the pleading stage,”33 
leading to another push for reform that resulted in the creation of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules) in 1938.34 
The goal in drafting the Federal Rules was to identify procedures 
that would “most efficiently foster decisions on the merits.”35 The 
Federal Rules ushered in an era of liberalized pleading as they 
“replaced fact pleading with notice pleading.”36 Rule 8(a)(2), which 
sets out what a plaintiff is required to state in the complaint, requires 
 
 27. S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 22 (1969). 
 28. CLARK, supra note 25, § 4, at 11–12.  
 29. The code was named after its principal draftsman David Dudley Field. Id. § 8, at 18.  
 30. Id. at 18–19. This language would later be incorporated into the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. See FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (“There is one form of action—the civil action.”). 
 31. CLARK, supra note 25, § 38, at 150.  
 32. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 574 (2007) (describing the struggle of 
distinguishing evidence, facts, and conclusions); CLARK, supra note 25, § 38, at 155 (describing 
“attempted distinction between facts, law and evidence” as a “convenient distinction of 
degree”).  
 33. DODSON, supra note 22, at 14. 
 34. See id. at 15–16 (tracing the movement from the Field Code to the Federal Rules). 
 35. Robert L. Carter, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a Vindicator of Civil Rights, 
137 U. PA. L. REV. 2179, 2179 (1989). 
 36. Thomson v. Washington, 362 F.3d 969, 970 (7th Cir. 2004). Notice pleading refers to a 
system of pleading created by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure where all that is required is 
“‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the 
plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) 
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)), abrogated by Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563.  
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that a plaintiff provide the court with “a short and plain statement of 
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”37 For over 
fifty years, lower courts based their understanding of Rule 8(a)’s 
requirements and the demands of “notice pleading” upon the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Conley v. Gibson.38 
II.  FEDERAL PLEADING STANDARDS FROM CONLEY TO IQBAL 
This Part summarizes the Court’s pre-Twombly precedents, 
briefly describes the changes wrought by Twombly and Iqbal, and 
shows that the Court continues to send lower courts mixed messages 
by citing affirmatively to pre-Twombly precedent. 
A. Pre-Twombly Precedent 
In Conley v. Gibson, the Supreme Court articulated Rule 8(a)’s 
requirements. Conley made clear that “the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon 
which he bases his claim.”39 The Court stated that, to satisfy Rule 
8(a), a complaint need only “give the defendant fair notice of what 
the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”40 Under 
this notice-pleading approach, a court would not dismiss a complaint 
“unless it appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set 
of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”41 
For nearly fifty years after Conley, notice pleading was the 
dominant standard employed by lower courts when assessing a 
complaint’s sufficiency.42 Although some lower courts pushed back by 
imposing judicially created heightened pleading standards,43 the 
Supreme Court struck down such standards in 1993 in Leatherman 
 
 37. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).  
 38. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims in the Post-Conley Era, 52 
HOW. L.J. 99, 102 (2008) (explaining that for several decades after Conley was decided, courts 
followed the decision’s notice-pleading standards).  
 39. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. at 45–46. 
 42. See Spencer, supra note 38, at 102–05 (noting that, in “the decade or so after Conley,” 
district courts applied notice pleading when testing the sufficiency of complaints).  
 43. Christopher Fairman and Richard Marcus have argued that lower courts have had a 
longstanding tendency to impose heightened pleading even after the Supreme Court insisted 
upon a notice-pleading standard in Conley. Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice 
Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 988 (2003); Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of 
Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1749, 1750 (1998).  
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and again in 2002 in Swierkiewicz. On both occasions, the Court 
reaffirmed its commitment to Conley and Rule 8(a)’s notice-pleading 
standard. 
In Leatherman, a police officer detected a chemical odor 
associated with methamphetamines outside of the Leatherman 
home.44 The police obtained a search warrant for the home based 
upon the officer’s observation and executed the warrant while the 
Leathermans were away.45 While searching for the narcotics, the 
officers shot and killed the two Leatherman family dogs.46 No drugs 
were recovered.47 The Leathermans filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
alleging that the officers’ conduct violated their Fourth Amendment 
rights.48 The federal district court dismissed the Leathermans’ 
complaint, finding that they failed to meet the Fifth Circuit’s 
“heightened pleading standard.”49 The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding 
that complaints alleging municipal liability under § 1983 must plead 
facts with particularity.50 
The Supreme Court reversed and unanimously held that a 
federal court may not apply a “heightened pleading standard” in civil-
rights cases alleging municipal liability.51 The Court reasoned that 
Rule 9(b) imposes a particularity requirement on pleadings alleging 
fraud or mistake,52 but does not make “any reference to complaints 
alleging municipal liability.”53 Therefore, lower courts cannot apply a 
heightened pleading requirement to complaints alleging municipal 
liability.54 
 
 44. Duke Univ. Sch. of Law, Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and 
Coordination Unit, YOUTUBE (Oct. 27, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
BZjlnyWGwh4&feature=youtu.be [http://perma.cc/WJH2-D83R] (documenting the 
circumstances surrounding the Leatherman case). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 
164–65 (1993). 
 49. Id. at 165. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 164. 
 52. “In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s 
mind may be alleged generally.” FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 53. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168. 
 54. Id. 
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More importantly, the Court found that a heightened pleading 
standard was “impossible to square” with the fact that Rule 8(a)(2) 
requires only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that 
the pleader is entitled to relief.”55 The Court emphatically endorsed 
notice pleading by saying “[i]n Conley v. Gibson, we said in effect that 
the Rule meant what it said.”56 
In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., the Court again rejected a 
heightened pleading standard, this time in the employment-
discrimination context. Akos Swierkiewicz was a fifty-three-year-old 
Hungarian native employed by Sorema N.A. as a senior vice 
president and chief underwriting officer (CUO).57 Sorema N.A. was 
owned and controlled by a French parent corporation.58 Almost six 
years after being hired, the CEO demoted Mr. Swierkiewicz59 and 
gave many of his responsibilities to a thirty-two-year-old French 
national.60 A year later, the CEO said that “he wanted to ‘energize’ 
the underwriting department” and he appointed the young 
Frenchman as CUO.61 Mr. Swierkiewicz brought suit alleging 
discrimination based on his age and national origin in violation of the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.62 The District Court for the Southern 
District of New York held that Swierkiewicz “ha[d] not adequately 
alleged circumstances that support an inference of discrimination.”63 
The Second Circuit affirmed.64 
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Thomas distinguished 
evidentiary standards from pleading standards.65 The Court held that 
an employment-discrimination complaint need not state specific facts 
making out a prima facie case.66 In doing so, the Court again endorsed 
Conley’s “no set of facts” standard and stated that “[g]iven the 
 
 55. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).  
 56. Id.  
 57. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002). 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 509.  
 63. Id. (alteration in original). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 511–12. 
 66. See id. at 515 (“[T]he Federal Rules do not contain a heightened pleading standard for 
employment discrimination suits.”). The prima facie case for employment discrimination was 
laid out by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).  
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Federal Rules’ simplified standard for pleading ‘[a] court may dismiss 
a complaint only if it is clear no relief could be granted under any set 
of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.’”67 The 
Court emphasized that its holding was not limited to employment-
discrimination cases. Rather, the Court said that “Rule 8(a)’s 
simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 
exceptions.”68 
With these two cases, the Supreme Court sent a clear message to 
lower courts: the notice-pleading standard of Rule 8(a) applied to all 
civil actions unless the Federal Rules or a federal statute specified 
otherwise. The Supreme Court left the notice-pleading framework 
untouched for five years, until it revisited civil pleading standards in 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. 
B. Twombly, Iqbal, and Thereafter 
The Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly69 marked a significant departure from the Court’s earlier 
pleading jurisprudence.70 Although Twombly and its potential impact 
have been the subject of an incredible amount of scholarly debate,71 
two points can be clearly distilled from the case. First, Justice Souter 
and the Twombly majority decided that Conley’s “no set of facts” 
language had “earned its retirement.”72 Second, the Court replaced 
the liberal Conley standard with a new “plausibility” standard.73 
Under this plausibility standard, a plaintiff must plead enough facts 
“to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”74 To be more 
than mere speculation, a complaint must state facts that move the 
 
 67. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514 (alteration in original) (quoting Hishon v. King & 
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)).  
 68. Id. at 513. The limited exceptions mentioned by the Court are Rule 9(b), see supra note 
52, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), which imposes a heightened 
pleading standard for claims involving securities fraud. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101(b), 109 Stat. 737, 747.  
 69. For a complete analysis of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, see generally Allan Ides, 
Bell Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to Pleading Practice, 243 F.R.D. 604 (2007).  
 70. Although Twombly introduced a new pleading paradigm, it did not overrule (or retire) 
any of the Court’s prior Rule 8 decisions other than Conley. In fact, Twombly reaffirms 
Swierkiewicz as good law. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569–70 (2007).  
 71. For examples of this debate, see supra note 12. 
 72. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563. 
 73. Id. at 556–57. 
 74. Id. at 555. 
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claim across “the line between possibility and plausibility.”75 Despite 
introducing a new standard, the Court maintained that they were not 
requiring “heightened fact pleading of specifics.”76 The Court clearly 
moved away from a notice-pleading interpretation of Rule 8(a) yet 
insisted that it was not raising pleading standards; this move created 
tension within the opinion. 
After Twombly, it was unclear whether or not Twombly’s new 
plausibility standard applied to all civil actions. Some thought that 
Twombly applied only in the antitrust context,77 while others 
contended that Twombly applied to all civil actions and that the days 
of notice pleading were over.78 The confusion and debate were fueled 
two years later when the Court attempted to clarify Twombly and 
plausibility pleading in Ashcroft v. Iqbal. 
Iqbal confirmed that the Twombly Court’s plausibility 
interpretation of Rule 8(a) was trans-substantive. Thus, the 
plausibility-pleading standard applies “in all civil actions and 
proceedings in the United States district courts.”79 Iqbal also outlined 
a “two-pronged approach” for courts to use when assessing a 
complaint’s sufficiency.80 First, courts must identify and disregard all 
legal allegations in the complaint that are conclusory in nature.81 
Second, courts must test whether the remaining nonconclusory 
allegations plausibly entitle the plaintiff to relief.82 The Court 
observed that determining plausibility is “a context-specific task that 
 
 75. Id. at 557. 
 76. Id. at 570.  
 77. See Kersenbrock v. Stoneman Cattle Co., No. 07-1044-MLB, 2007 WL 2219288, at *2 
n.2 (D. Kan. July 30, 2007) (“Bell Atlantic deals only with pleading requirements in the highly 
complex context of an antitrust conspiracy case.”); see also Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, 
LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488–89 (6th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (noting that Twombly’s plausibility-
pleading standard was confined to cases involving “expensive, complicated litigation” (quoting 
Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009))).  
 78. See ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 n.2 (2d Cir. 2007) (“We 
have declined to read Twombly’s flexible ‘plausibility standard’ as relating only to antitrust 
cases.” (citing Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d and remanded sub nom. 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009))); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. 
REV. 431, 431 (2008) (“Notice pleading is dead.”); Dodson, supra note 12, at 138 (“Clearly, 
Conley’s ‘no set of facts’ language is dead . . . .”). 
 79. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).  
 80. Id. at 679. 
 81. See id. at 678 (“[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations 
contained in the complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”).  
 82. Id. at 679 (“[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion 
to dismiss.”). 
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requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 
common sense.”83 
The tension lower courts must reconcile can be summed up as 
follows: Iqbal makes it clear that Twombly applies to all civil actions,84 
yet Swierkiewicz, which was reaffirmed by Twombly,85 and 
Leatherman stand for the proposition that Rule 8(a)’s notice-pleading 
standard also applies to all civil actions. Moreover, Twiqbal never 
explicitly overruled either Leatherman or Swierkiewicz. Only the 
Supreme Court can overrule its own decisions; thus these pre-
Twombly precedents should not be disregarded by lower courts as no 
longer being in line with the Court’s current thinking.86 
In fact, given the Court’s recent decision in Johnson v. City of 
Shelby,87 it appears that both Leatherman and Swierkiewicz remain 
viable. In Johnson, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
rejection of a plaintiff’s due-process claim because the plaintiff did 
not invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in her complaint.88 The Supreme Court 
summarily reversed and held that “no heightened pleading rule 
requires plaintiffs seeking damages for violations of constitutional 
rights to invoke § 1983 expressly in order to state a claim.”89 In 
support of its holding, the Court cited positively to both Leatherman 
and Swierkiewicz,90 suggesting that both cases remain at the forefront 
of the Court’s Rule 8(a) jurisprudence. 
When the Supreme Court held that Twombly’s plausibility 
pleading standard applied to all civil actions, it created tension with 
its prior Rule 8(a) precedents that relied on the more lenient notice-
pleading standard. The discord is due, in part, to the fact that the 
Court did not overrule its pre-Twombly precedents. Indeed, the 
Court saw no reason to overrule its prior case law as it maintained 
that Twombly did not create a more stringent pleading standard.91 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 684. 
 85. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007).  
 86. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (noting that only the Court has “the 
prerogative of overruling its own decisions” (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. 
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989))). Professor Adam Steinman has made this point in the 
same context. See Steinman, supra note 12, at 1320–23 (arguing that pre-Twombly case law 
remains good law).  
 87. Johnson v. City of Shelby, 135 S. Ct. 346 (2014) (per curiam).  
 88. Id. at 346. 
 89. Id. at 347. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569 n.14 (2007). 
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Lower courts and commentators have had a difficult time accepting 
this claim. The next Part focuses on how the federal courts of appeals 
have treated Leatherman and Swierkiewicz after Iqbal. 
III.  CIRCUIT COURT TREATMENT OF LEATHERMAN AND 
SWIERKIEWICZ 
The federal circuit courts of appeals that have confronted the 
issue92 have taken discordant views on the vitality of pre-Twombly 
precedents. The cases reveal three approaches. Two circuits have 
noted the tension between pre-Twombly case law and Twiqbal but 
have declined to resolve the issue. Another five circuits have held that 
pre-Twombly case law remains good law, with one of these courts 
going so far as to still apply the notice-pleading standard. Finally, 
three circuits have radically reinterpreted pre-Twombly authority. 
A. Courts Declining to Resolve the Issue 
Decisions by the Second and Ninth Circuits illustrate the 
difficulty of defining a uniform pleading standard. Neither case 
definitively resolves the tension between pre-Twombly authority and 
Twiqbal, which leaves the status of pre-Twombly precedent an open 
question in these circuits. 
In Hedges v. Town of Madison,93 a plaintiff brought an 
employment-discrimination suit against his former employer, the 
Town of Madison, and various town officials.94 The plaintiff’s 
complaint stated that he was fired because he was nearing retirement 
age, but the only fact alleged in support of this claim was the 
plaintiff’s age.95 The Second Circuit opened by observing that “[t]he 
pleading standard for employment-discrimination complaints is 
somewhat of an open question in our circuit.”96 The court laid out the 
competing standards of Swierkiewicz and Twombly, and mused that 
“Swierkiewicz[’s] reliance on Conley suggests that, at a minimum, 
 
 92. As of February 2016, the Fifth Circuit has published no opinions discussing the 
applicability of Leatherman and Swierkiewicz in a post-Iqbal world.  
 93. Hedges v. Town of Madison, 456 F. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 94. Id. at 22–23. 
 95. Id. at 23. Plaintiff also alleged that his firing violated the Americans with Disabilities 
Act and Rehabilitation Act. Id. However, his complaint did not allege that he qualified as 
disabled under these acts. Id. at 24. Rather, he argued that the “district court should have 
inferred he was disabled” given a litany of health issues he suffered from. Id.  
 96. Id. at 23. 
TESORIERO IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/15/2016  12:30 PM 
1534 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:1521 
employment-discrimination claims must meet the standard of 
pleading set forth in Twombly and Iqbal.”97 The court nonetheless 
opined that it “need not resolve these conflicts here,” as the plaintiff 
had failed to meet “any conceivable standard of pleading.”98 The 
court thus avoided making any decisions about Swierkiewicz’s 
continued vitality. 
Starr v. Baca,99 out of the Ninth Circuit, is another example of a 
court expressing confusion over what pleading standard to apply. In 
Starr, the plaintiff brought a damages action under § 1983, alleging 
that police officers endorsed other inmates’ violent attack on the 
plaintiff while he was an inmate in a Los Angeles County jail.100 The 
district court dismissed the plaintiff’s supervisory-liability claim, 
which was based upon the sheriff’s alleged deliberate indifference to 
the plaintiff’s injury.101 The Ninth Circuit disagreed and held that the 
plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to satisfy Rule 8(a), but the court 
struggled to identify the appropriate pleading standard: 
The juxtaposition of Swierkiewicz . . . on the one hand, . . . and . . . 
Twombly[] and Iqbal, on the other, is perplexing. Even though the 
Court stated . . . that it was applying Rule 8(a), it is hard to avoid the 
conclusion that, in fact, the Court applied a higher pleading standard 
in . . . Twombly and Iqbal.102 
The court did not make a definitive statement about the status of 
pre-Twombly precedent within the circuit. Instead, the court 
extracted principles common to both standards and created a hybrid 
standard that would permit more claims to survive a motion to 
dismiss than would otherwise under the plausibility-pleading 
regime.103 The court framed this two-part rule as follows: 
First, to be entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a 
complaint . . . may not simply recite the elements of a cause of 
action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to 
give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself 
 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. 
 99. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2011).  
 100. Id. at 1204. 
 101. Id. at 1205. 
 102. Id. at 1215.  
 103. Id. at 1216 (“To the extent that we perceive a difference in the application of Rule 8(a) 
in the two groups of cases, it is difficult to know in cases that come before us whether we should 
apply the more lenient or the more demanding standard.”). 
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effectively. Second, the factual allegations that are taken as true 
must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not 
unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense 
of discovery and continued litigation.104 
Using this rule, the court reversed the district court and 
remanded the case.105 This standard still governs cases in the Ninth 
Circuit. But, as the district court cases in Part V suggest, it is unclear 
that this rule provides any more certainty than the competing 
standards created by the Supreme Court. 
B. Circuits Holding that Pre-Twombly Precedent Remains Good 
Law 
Other circuits have been willing to go beyond simply 
acknowledging the tension in the Supreme Court’s pleading 
jurisprudence and have concluded that pre-Twombly precedent is still 
good law. The common thread among these cases is a reliance on 
Swierkiewicz and/or an affirmative statement that it remains good law 
after Twiqbal.106 
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Keys v. Humana107 illustrates the 
reasoning these circuits apply. In Keys, an African American 
employee brought racial-discrimination claims under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964108 and § 1981109 against her former 
employer.110 The district court granted Humana’s motion to dismiss, 
but the Sixth Circuit reversed, relying on Swierkiewicz to hold that 
the complaint sufficiently stated a claim.111 The court noted that “[t]he 
 
 104. Id. at 1216. 
 105. Id. at 1217. 
 106. This Section does not fully review each of these cases. Those not specifically addressed 
are Horras v. Am. Capital Strategies, Ltd., 729 F.3d 798 (8th Cir. 2013), Khalik v. United Air 
Lines, 671 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2012), and Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400 (7th Cir. 
2010).  
 107. Keys v. Humana, 684 F.3d 605 (6th Cir. 2012).  
 108. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012).  
 109. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012). This Section provides that  
[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in 
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give 
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security 
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like 
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no 
other. 
Id. § 1981(a). 
 110. Keys, 684 F.3d at 606. 
 111. Id. at 609–10. 
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Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions in Twombly and Iqbal did not 
alter its holding in Swierkiewicz.”112 The court went on to reiterate 
that the Sixth Circuit has “recognized the continuing viability of 
Swierkiewicz’s holding” and that “it would be ‘inaccurate to read 
[Twombly and Iqbal] so narrowly as to be the death of notice 
pleading.’”113 The court thus “recognize[d] the continuing viability of 
the ‘short and plain’ language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
8.”114 
Although this Sixth Circuit case is notable for its endorsement of 
Swierkiewicz, the Eleventh Circuit went even further in its 
affirmation of the vitality of pre-Twombly precedent in Palm Beach 
Golf Center–Boca, Inc. v. John G. Sarris, D.D.S., P.A.115 The case is 
factually distinct from the others addressed in this Note,116 but is 
notable for its reading of Twombly and Iqbal. In holding that the 
plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently stated a claim, the court stated that 
“under the Federal Rules’ simplified standard for pleading [a] court 
may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be 
granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with 
the allegations.”117 This is a direct application of Swierkiewicz’s 
notice-pleading standard, which was based on Conley’s “no set of 
facts” language. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit apparently does not view 
Twombly and Iqbal as having displaced notice pleading or any 
important pre-Twombly precedents, like Swierkiewicz. 
C. Circuit Courts that Radically Reinterpreted Pre-Twombly 
Precedent 
Three circuits have followed the logic that, because Twombly 
retired Conley’s “no set of facts” language, the Supreme Court’s pre-
Twombly authorities that relied on Conley are no longer viable. 
 
 112. Id. at 609.  
 113. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting HDC, LLC v. City of Ann Arbor, 675 F.3d 608, 614 
(6th Cir. 2012)). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Palm Beach Golf Center–Boca, Inc. v. John G. Sarris, D.D.S., P.A., 781 F.3d 1245 (11th 
Cir. 2015). 
 116. “Palm Beach Golf Center–Boca, Inc. received an unsolicited one-page fax 
advertisement, promoting dental services provided by” dentist John G. Sarris, the owner of a 
Florida dental practice. Id. at 1248. Thereafter, Palm Beach Golf brought a class-action suit 
against Sarris, D.D.S., claiming that the fax advertisement violated the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act of 1991. Id. at 1248–49.  
 117. Id. at 1260 (alteration in original) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 
514 (2002)). 
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Although this reasoning has been disavowed by the Supreme Court,118 
it highlights the conflict and confusion lower courts encounter when 
deciding the proper pleading standard for civil cases. 
In Rodríguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodríguez,119 several plaintiffs 
sued their former employer under § 1983, alleging discrimination 
based on their political affiliation.120 Reversing the district court, the 
First Circuit held that the plaintiffs had sufficiently stated a claim.121 In 
doing so, the court stated that “the Swierkiewicz holding remains 
good law” after Iqbal.122 But the court relied on Swierkiewicz’s 
applicability regarding the “disconnect between the prima facie case 
and the rules of pleading” and not Swierkiewicz’s interpretation of 
Rule 8(a)’s requirements.123 The court clarified that “[t]o the extent 
that the Swierkiewicz Court relied on Conley v. Gibson to describe 
the pleading standard, that description is no longer viable.”124 
The Third Circuit too has noted the “demise of Swierkiewicz.”125 
In Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,126 the plaintiff filed a disability-
discrimination claim.127 Much like the First Circuit in Rodríguez-
Reyes, the Third Circuit drew a distinction between evidentiary 
standards and pleading standards and held that the plaintiff had 
sufficiently pleaded her claim.128 After asking “the parties to comment 
on the continued viability of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
 
 118. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (“We reaffirm that ‘[i]f a precedent of 
this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other 
line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to 
this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989))).  
 119. Rodríguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 120. Id. at 52. 
 121. Id. at 58. 
 122. Id. at 53–54.  
 123. Id. at 54 n.3. 
 124. Id. (citation omitted). 
 125. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 126. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009).  
 127. Id. at 206. 
 128. See id. at 213. The court also stated that 
[a]t this stage of the litigation, the District Court should have focused on the 
appropriate threshold question—namely whether Fowler pleaded she is an individual 
with a disability. The District Court and UPMC instead focused on what Fowler can 
“prove,” apparently maintaining that since she cannot prove she is disabled she 
cannot sustain a prima facie failure-to-transfer claim. A determination whether a 
prima facie case has been made, however, is an evidentiary inquiry—it defines the 
quantum of proof plaintiff must present to create a rebuttable presumption of 
discrimination. 
Id.  
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Swierkiewicz,” the court found that “Swierkiewicz is based, in part, on 
Conley” and “that because Conley has been specifically repudiated by 
both Twombly and Iqbal, so too has Swierkiewicz, at least insofar as it 
concerns pleading requirements and relies on Conley.”129 
The most recent circuit court to radically reinterpret pre-
Twombly authority is the Fourth Circuit in McCleary-Evans v. 
Maryland Department of Transportation. The plaintiff in McCleary-
Evans, an African American female, brought a claim against her 
employer alleging violations of Title VII.130 Specifically, the plaintiff 
alleged that her employer gave two positions to white candidates, 
instead of to her, on account of her race and gender.131 The district 
court held that the plaintiff’s “complaint failed to allege facts that 
plausibly support a claim of discrimination” and granted the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss.132 
On appeal, McCleary-Evans claimed “that the district court 
imposed on her a pleading standard ‘more rigorous’ than 
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. allows.”133 The Fourth Circuit affirmed 
the district court and held that the plaintiff’s reliance on Swierkiewicz 
was misplaced.134 Judge Niemeyer noted that Swierkiewicz “applied a 
pleading standard more relaxed than the plausible-claim standard 
required by Iqbal and Twombly.”135 The dissent, written by Judge 
Wynn, contended that Swierkiewicz should have applied, saying that 
the majority had “entirely ignore[d] the factual underpinnings of the 
Swierkiewicz holding, looking solely to the Supreme Court’s 2009 
decision in Iqbal to guide its decision.”136 Despite the apparent tension 
between Iqbal and Swierkiewicz, Judge Wynn noted that lower 
federal courts “have no authority to overrule a Supreme Court 
decision no matter . . . how out of touch with the Supreme Court’s 
current thinking the decision seems.”137 
 
 129. Id. at 211.  
 130. McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep’t of Transp., 780 F.3d 582, 583 (4th Cir. 2015), petition for 
cert. filed, 84 U.S.L.W. 3260 (U.S. Aug. 26, 2015) (No. 15-573). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 584 (citation omitted). 
 134. See id. at 586 (“A closer look at Swierkiewicz . . . reveals that it does not support 
[McCleary-Evans’s] position.”). 
 135. Id. at 587. 
 136. Id. at 589 (Wynn, J., dissenting).  
 137. Id. at 590 (alteration in original) (quoting Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014, 
1018 (7th Cir. 2002)).  
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These three circuits have effectively overruled Swierkiewicz 
insofar as it relies on Conley for the appropriate Rule 8(a) pleading 
requirements. Because Leatherman also relies on Conley, it can be 
assumed that these courts would also question Leatherman’s 
continued utility. The circuits are clearly split on the viability of pre-
Twombly case law. With this uncertainty at the circuit level, the 
confusion is only compounded among the district courts. 
IV.  METHODOLOGY 
Although some commentators contend that Twombly and Iqbal 
can be read as consistent with prior notice-pleading case law, 
questions remain as to the vitality of pre-Twombly precedent.138 Just 
because it is possible to interpret these cases as being consistent with 
one another does not mean that this is the approach being taken by 
the lower courts. So, the question driving this study is as follows: How 
are lower courts treating Swierkiewicz and Leatherman now that they 
must apply the plausibility-pleading framework announced by 
Twombly and Iqbal? 
To answer this question, this study focuses on district court cases 
decided between June 2009 and December 2014. This date span 
begins one month after Iqbal was decided, allowing time for district 
courts to begin applying plausibility pleading trans-substantively. The 
study is limited to claims involving 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Rule 
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. As 12(b)(6) motions test the legal 
sufficiency of a claim, these are the cases where courts decide the 
appropriate pleading standard, thus giving insight into how lower 
courts have treated Leatherman and Swierkiewicz after Twombly and 
Iqbal. The district court cases were gathered from the commercial 
database Westlaw139 based on a search in the federal district court 
database that first excluded cases involving pro se plaintiffs and then 
searching for all cases that (1) had a claim involving “42 U.S.C. 1983,” 
and (2) included a citation to “12(b)(6).”140 The considerations 
 
 138. See Steinman, supra note 12, at 1302 (arguing that attempts to read Rule 8’s general 
pleading standards more strictly, pre-Twombly, “were consistently rebuffed by the Supreme 
Court in unequivocal terms”).  
 139. All cases in this study were returned using the search terms “42 U.S.C. 1983” & 
“12(b)(6) % pro se” in the Westlaw federal district court database (DCT).  
 140. This search was conducted on March 23, 2015. Some of the cases retrieved were cases 
involving Rule 12(c) motions for judgments on the pleadings. These cases were included in the 
results because Rule 12(c) motions are decided under the same legal standard as Rule 12(b)(6) 
motions. See, e.g., Bank of New York v. First Millennium, Inc., 607 F.3d 905, 922 (2d Cir. 2010) 
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informing this choice were similar to other studies.141 This search 
retrieved 732 opinions meeting the search terms. Of these, seventy-
four cited Leatherman or Swierkiewicz. 
Both Leatherman and Swierkiewicz were civil-rights cases. 
Focusing on cases that involved § 1983 claims, the main statutory 
vehicle for bringing civil-rights claims, ensured that the cases 
represent a variety of civil-rights claims. This variety guaranteed that 
there would be cases where it was appropriate for plaintiffs to rely on 
either Leatherman or Swierkiewicz for support. 
This sample size—seventy-four opinions—is adequate because 
the goal of this study is not to identify a quantitative trend, but rather 
to engage in a substantive analysis of lower-court decisions. This Note 
aims to assess the continued vitality of pre-Twombly precedent after 
Iqbal and highlight the confusion among lower courts. The hope is 
that this study will serve as an impetus for future empirical work from 
which broader conclusions can be discerned regarding lower courts’ 
reinterpretation of Leatherman and Swierkiewicz in ways that the 
Supreme Court did not appear to intend. 
This study is unique in so far as it looks at the substance of these 
seventy-four cases and categorizes them based on their treatment of 
pre-Twombly precedent. All seventy-four cases were read and 
divided into three categories: positive, negative, and neutral. Cases 
falling in the positive category made statements that Leatherman and 
Swierkiewicz remained good law. These cases also either squarely 
applied a notice-pleading standard or viewed plausibility pleading 
through the lens of pre-Twombly case law. Negative cases applied a 
plausibility-pleading standard but did so by radically reinterpreting 
pre-Twombly precedent. By “radically reinterpret,” I mean that these 
cases noted that a plaintiff’s reliance on Leatherman or Swierkiewicz 
was misguided and found that these cases no longer controlled in light 
of Iqbal, despite the fact that Twombly and Iqbal never overruled any 
 
(“The same standard applicable to . . . 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss applies to . . . 12(c) motions 
for judgment on the pleadings.”). 
 141. See, e.g., CECIL ET AL., supra note 15, at 6 n.10 (choosing to exclude pro se and prisoner 
cases because they are “governed by standards other than Twombly and Iqbal”); Hannon, supra 
note 15, at 1828–29 (analyzing 12(b)(6) motions to examine if federal district courts require 
more from pleadings after Twombly because (1) “the 12(b)(6) motion is used to test the legal 
sufficiency of a claim”; (2) Twombly affirmed a grant of a 12(b)(6) motion to make “its most 
sweeping pronouncements regarding Rule 8” and introduce plausibility pleading; and (3) 
12(b)(6) motions are easy to analyze empirically because they can only “be granted, denied, or 
granted-in-part/denied-in-part”).  
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pre-Twombly precedents.142 Cases were labeled neutral if they cited to 
Leatherman and Swierkiewicz but did not make any statements as to 
the continued vitality of these cases. Neutral cases appeared either to 
apply plausibility pleading or to reconcile the tension in the Court’s 
pleading jurisprudence. This methodology yielded the following 
results. 
V.  DISTRICT COURT TREATMENT OF PRE-TWOMBLY CASE LAW 
AFTER IQBAL 
The federal district courts, the front lines of litigation, take 
differing views on the proper pleading standard and the continued 
viability of pre-Twombly case law. Each of the 732 district court cases 
gathered here assesses, at least in part, the sufficiency of a complaint 
being challenged under Rule 12(b)(6).143 This Part looks at the 
substance of some of these decisions and how they affected a court’s 
ruling on the motion to dismiss. 
A. District Court Cases: The Substance 
The majority of the district court cases read for this study apply a 
plausibility-pleading standard, meaning that they directly apply the 
standard laid out in Twiqbal. This is true for about 77 percent (57 of 
74) of the cases reviewed. Of great interest here, roughly 24.6 percent 
(14 of 57) of the cases that applied plausibility pleading do so by 
radically reinterpreting pre-Twombly precedent.144 
 
 142. These courts never outright decided that Leatherman or Swierkiewicz were overruled. 
Rather, they overrule these cases by implication by noting that they are no longer useful in light 
of Twombly and Iqbal.  
 143. The remaining 658 cases in the data set that do not cite Leatherman or Swierkiewicz are 
comprised of civil-rights claims that do not involve employment discrimination or municipal 
liability. Section 1983 is the main vehicle for redressing constitutional and federal statutory 
violations. Thus, the types of claims falling under § 1983 vary greatly. Some examples of claims 
found in the 658 cases in this study were claims brought by prisoners, excessive force claims, 
violations of procedural and substantive due process, and unlawful search and seizure claims. 
Because these claims did not cite to Leatherman or Swierkiewicz they are not reviewed further 
here. 
 144. In other words, 18.9 percent (14 of 74) of the cases apply Iqbal and effectively overrule 
pre-Twombly precedent. The remaining forty-three of the fifty-seven cases that apply a 
plausibility-pleading standard do not call into question the vitality of pre-Twombly case law. 
These forty-three cases are categorized as neutral and are not specifically reviewed here since 
they do not express views on the continued utility of pre-Twombly precedent.  
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Hodges v. Government of District of Columbia145 is paradigmatic 
of the reasoning district courts are applying in cases that are 
effectively overruling pre-Twombly precedent—that is, reasoning that 
questions Swierkiewicz and Leatherman’s vitality. The plaintiffs, four 
individuals, were arrested for disorderly conduct and released 
following a “post-and-forfeit” procedure.146 The procedure involved 
the plaintiffs paying $35.00 “to obtain their immediate release and 
resolution of their criminal charges.”147 Plaintiffs were offered the 
option of following the post-and-forfeit procedure or spending the 
night in jail and appearing before a court in the morning.148 Plaintiffs 
brought suit under § 1983 alleging that they were offered no other 
release options (such as citation and release) and argued that this 
policy and their arrests violated their Fourth Amendment rights.149 
The district court held that the plaintiffs’ complaints failed to state a 
claim under § 1983.150 
Specifically, the court noted that even though this claim arose 
under § 1983, it had to “satisfy the criteria established in Iqbal and 
Twombly.”151 Although it noted that the D.C. Circuit had once 
articulated a less stringent pleading standard, the court stated that 
this precedent “preceded Iqbal, and must now be interpreted in light 
of that subsequent Supreme Court decision.”152 The court rejected the 
reasoning that “Twombly and Iqbal should be read in conjunction 
with earlier cases on the sufficiency of municipal-liability allegations, 
in particular, Leatherman” by stating that “[t]his Court is not 
confident that the Leatherman test survives Twombly and Iqbal.”153 
Rather than deal with the fact that the court had two applicable lines 
of reasoning before it, the court simply brushed away relevant 
Supreme Court authority.154 
 
 145. Hodges v. Gov’t of D.C., 975 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2013).  
 146. Id. at 38. 
 147. Id. at 39. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 48. Plaintiffs also alleged that they were arrested without probable cause and that 
the arrest violated their First Amendment rights. Id. at 39. 
 150. Id. at 47–48. 
 151. Id. at 54. 
 152. Id. (quoting Smith v. District of Columbia, 674 F. Supp. 2d 209, 214 n.2 (D.D.C. 2009)).  
 153. Id. at 55 n.15.  
 154. Other district courts have applied the same reasoning with different language. See, e.g., 
Hass v. Sacramento Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 2:13-CV-01746 JAM KJN, 2014 WL 1616440, at *6 
(E.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2014) (“Plaintiff’s citation to pre-Twombly case law is unhelpful . . . given 
the heightened pleading requirements that have subsequently developed.”).  
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One final example of the reasoning district courts apply when 
effectively overruling pre-Twombly case law is Mayfield v. County of 
Merced.155 The plaintiff, a lawyer, filed suit under Title VII and § 1983 
against her employer, alleging race and sex discrimination and 
retaliation.156 The District Court for the Eastern District of California 
dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim and 
found the plaintiff’s “reliance on Leatherman . . . for the premise that 
a complaint must only include a ‘short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’ is outdated. The 
current pleading standard was altered by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Twombly.”157 This quote highlights absolute confusion 
over the state of pleading standards. Although this is a reasonable 
interpretation of what the Court did in Twombly, other courts 
maintain that, even after Twombly, a plaintiff still need only assert “a 
short and plain statement” of the claim to satisfy Rule 8(a).158 No 
matter the language these courts use, the former reasoning still 
effectively renders Leatherman and Swierkiewicz “hollow shell[s].”159 
On the other end of the spectrum, about 23 percent (17 of 74) of 
the cases in this study cite Swierkiewicz and Leatherman positively 
and apply them without regard to Twiqbal. Two recent cases illustrate 
the types of cases that fall into the category of “positive” in their 
treatment of pre-Twombly precedent. In Hernandez v. County of 
Monterey,160 the plaintiffs were inmates or recently released inmates 
of the Monterey County jail.161 Their complaints alleged, in part, 
overcrowding, inadequate training, poor facilities, and inadequate 
access to medical and mental health care screening.162 The court 
dismissed the defendants’ motion to dismiss and, after citing 
Twombly, quoted directly from Swierkiewicz and stated that the court 
could only dismiss a claim when “it is clear that no relief could be 
granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with 
 
 155. Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendant County of Merced’s Motion to 
Dismiss, Mayfield v. Cty. of Merced, No. 1:13-cv-01619, 2014 WL 5822913 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 
2014).  
 156. Id. at *1. 
 157. Id. at *2 n.3. 
 158. FED. R. CIV. P. 8. Moreover, from a common-sense perspective, a statement of the 
claim can state plausible facts and still be “short and plain” in nature.  
 159. McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep’t of Transp., 780 F.3d 582, 592 (4th Cir. 2015) (Wynn, J., 
dissenting), petition for cert. filed, 84 U.S.L.W. 3260 (U.S. Aug. 26, 2015) (No. 15-573). 
 160. Hernandez v. Cty. of Monterey, 70 F. Supp. 3d 963 (N.D. Cal. 2014).  
 161. Id. at 967. 
 162. Id. at 968. 
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the allegations.”163 Applying this language, which was based on 
Conley,164 is akin to applying a notice-pleading standard. 
Finally, in Jackson v. Pena165 the victim of a police-involved 
shooting sued individual police officers, the Baltimore Police 
Department, the mayor, and the city council under § 1983.166 The 
district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part, but 
found that the plaintiff did allege facts sufficient to state a municipal-
liability claim against the police department.167 The court squarely 
applied Leatherman.168 Noting that there is no heightened pleading for 
municipal claims, the court stated that in order to survive a motion to 
dismiss a plaintiff pleading a municipal-liability claim “need only 
satisfy Rule 8(a) by providing ‘a short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.’”169 Although some courts 
have seen Twombly and Iqbal as causing a sea change in pleading 
jurisprudence, the courts mentioned here show that notice pleading is 
still being applied in the post-Iqbal era. 
The seventy-four cases analyzed in this study yield two important 
observations. First, courts remain confused about what pleading 
standard to apply, especially given the tension between pre-Twombly 
case law and the plausibility-pleading standard announced in 
Twiqbal. Second, some courts resolve this tension by effectively 
overruling Swierkiewicz and Leatherman despite Supreme Court 
pronouncements that these cases remain good law. These 
observations highlight a need for further study and, perhaps, Supreme 
Court intervention. 
B. District Court Cases: The Results 
Thus far this study has been unique in its attempts to assess 
Twombly and Iqbal’s impact by focusing on application and reasoning 
rather than results alone. Although the focus should be on accurate 
lower-court reasoning and analysis independent of results, actual 
outcomes for the parties are important. Looking at the outcomes of 
 
 163. Id. at 969 (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)).  
 164. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957) (“[A] complaint should not be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove 
no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”).  
 165. Jackson v. Pena, 28 F. Supp. 3d 423 (D. Md. 2014).  
 166. Id. at 427.  
 167. Id. at 434–35. 
 168. Id. at 433. 
 169. Id. (quoting Lanford v. Prince George’s Cty., 199 F. Supp. 2d 297, 304 (D. Md. 2002)). 
TESORIERO IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/15/2016  12:30 PM 
2016] PRE-TWOMBLY PRECEDENT 1545 
these motions to dismiss also helps identify substantive trends. This 
Section shows how courts have ruled on 12(b)(6) motions depending 
upon their treatment of pre-Twombly case law. The results are 
recorded in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Overall Results of 12(b)(6) Motions 
Treatment of  
Pre-Twombly Caselaw 
Motion 
Granted 
Motion 
Denied 
Granted in 
Part & Denied 
in Part 
Swierkiewicz 
Positive 0 3 7 
Negative 2 0 4 
Neutral  11 4 14 
Leatherman 
Positive 0 1 6 
Negative 4 0 4 
Neutral  7 2 5 
 
These results show a potential correlation between how courts 
treat pre-Twombly authority and how they rule on defendants’ 
motions to dismiss: when courts have taken a positive view of 
Leatherman and Swierkiewicz, they have not granted a motion to 
dismiss in full. That is not to say that these courts let any and all 
claims through. These same courts have, on thirteen occasions, still 
engaged in merits screening at the pleading stage by granting the 
motion in part and denying it in part.170 Conversely, none of the 
observed courts that effectively overruled Leatherman and 
Swierkiewicz denied a motion to dismiss. This means that, in these 
courts, plaintiffs and their lawyers are relying on good law to their 
detriment. 
In contrast, the wider spread of results in the “neutral” category 
may reflect attempts to reconcile the tension in pleading standard 
jurisprudence. Rather than deciding that either pre-Twombly case 
law or Twiqbal plausibility applies to all cases, these courts appear to 
 
 170. These thirteen cases are comprised of the “positive” treatments of both Swierkiewicz 
and Leatherman recorded in the “Granted in Part & Denied in Part” column of Table 1. 
Looking at these “mixed” results is also revealing. Courts that treated Swierkiewicz and 
Leatherman positively or neutrally were more likely to deny the 12(b)(6) motion for the part of 
the claim based on § 1983. Conversely, the courts that reinterpreted pre-Twombly case law and 
severely questioned their viability were more likely to grant the 12(b)(6) motion when it came 
to § 1983 claims.  
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be looking at each case’s underlying facts to decide which of the two 
relevant standards applies. For example, in Kleehammer v. Monroe 
County171 the court noted that the plaintiff contended that “the 
pleading standard for an employment-discrimination case was set by 
the Supreme Court in Swierkiewicz.”172 In assessing this claim, the 
court laid out the pleading standard it was applying as follows: 
The Twombly court held that Swierkiewicz remains good law. 
However, some courts and commentators have concluded that 
Twombly and Iqbal repudiated Swierkiewicz, at least to the extent 
that Swierkiewicz relied upon pre-Twombly pleading standards. 
Reconciling Swierkiewicz, Twombly, and Iqbal, a complaint need 
not establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination to 
survive a motion to dismiss; however, “the claim must be facially 
plausible and must give fair notice to the defendants of the basis for 
the claim.”173 
Until the Supreme Court speaks again on the issue, this approach 
aligns most closely with Supreme Court pronouncements on how 
lower courts should treat conflicting precedent.174 Namely, by 
recognizing that absent a Supreme Court ruling, the relevant case law 
still applies. 
These observations are based off of the seventy-four cases read 
for this study. A larger trans-substantive study is necessary to confirm 
these trends and provide greater insight regarding how Twombly and 
Iqbal and lower-court treatment of pre-Twombly authority are 
affecting access to the next phases of litigation. But this study does 
begin to reveal the confusion lower courts are facing as they attempt 
to assess the continued vitality of pre-Twombly precedent. 
VI.  THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFUSION 
The cases in this study illustrate the “confusion and disarray 
among judges and lawyers” caused by the tension between pre-
 
 171. Kleehammer v. Monroe Cty., 743 F. Supp. 2d 175 (W.D.N.Y 2010).  
 172. Id. at 183.  
 173. Barbosa v. Continuum Health Partners, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 2d 210, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(footnotes omitted) (quoting Fowler v. Scores Holding Co., 677 F. Supp. 2d 673, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009)).  
 174. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) 
(“If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons 
rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which 
directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”). 
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Twombly precedent and Twiqbal.175 These cases produce two 
additional insights. First, that some courts are effectively overruling 
relevant Supreme Court case law. And second, that notice pleading is 
far from retired. 
A. Lower Courts Reinterpreting Pre-Twombly Precedent 
Twombly’s announcement that Rule 8(a)(2) required a plaintiff 
to plead plausible facts in their complaint was “wholly inconsistent 
with Supreme Court precedent.”176 However, other than abrogating 
Conley, the Court did not overrule any of its other Rule 8(a) 
jurisprudence. As this study has shown, to reconcile this 
inconsistency, some courts have effectively overruled Leatherman and 
Swierkiewicz. This approach is unacceptable for two reasons. 
First, lower courts overruling Leatherman and Swierkiewicz run 
afoul of the Supreme Court’s longstanding instruction that only the 
Court has “the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”177 
Although these lower courts are clearly wrong, they are not entirely 
to blame. The Supreme Court has sent them conflicting messages and 
has itself deviated from the requirements of stare decisis. As Justice 
White noted in Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs,178 “the 
doctrine of stare decisis demands that we attempt to reconcile our 
prior decisions rather than hastily overrule some of them.”179 But this 
does not seem to have been the Court’s approach in Twombly and 
Iqbal. Rather than announce that the Court was creating a new 
pleading standard, thereby being forced to both confront past 
precedent and provide a “special justification”180 for doing so, the 
Court maintained that it simply was not raising pleading standards. 
Thus, commands that only the Court can overrule its precedents 
coupled with the Court’s unwillingness to reconcile its past 
 
 175. See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 31 (2010).  
 176. Spencer, supra note 78, at 460. 
 177. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 
484); see also Ides, supra note 69, at 635 (“Of course, the Court is free to overrule any line of 
cases, but in the absence of an express overruling one should at least be circumspect in 
concluding that the execution has occurred.”); Steinman, supra note 12, at 1323 (arguing against 
the view that because Twombly and Iqbal are in “profound conflict with prior precedent that 
lower courts ought to deem the earlier cases to have been implicitly overruled”).  
 178. Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990). 
 179. Id. at 99–100. 
 180. See Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) (“[D]eparture from the doctrine of 
stare decisis demands special justification.”).  
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precedents with newly created standards puts lower courts in a bind. 
Lower courts see the Supreme Court saying that is not creating a 
heightened pleading standard but, given that plausibility pleading 
seems inconsistent with earlier Rule 8(a) case law, these courts 
believe the Supreme Court is actually heightening pleading standards. 
Moreover, since the Court is giving them ambiguous instructions on 
how to apply plausibility pleading, it is, in essence, licensing the type 
of behavior observed in lower courts in this study. 
Second, and more simply, lower courts that are effectively 
overruling binding Supreme Court case law are denying plaintiffs 
justice because plaintiffs and their lawyers are relying to their 
detriment on cases they believe to be good law. 
B. Confusion in the Lower Courts 
The confusion among lower courts after Iqbal is further 
highlighted by the fact that some courts are still applying an outright 
notice-pleading standard. There are “federal interests in uniformity, 
certainty, and the minimization of unnecessary litigation” and the 
discordant approaches taken by lower courts undermine these 
interests.181 
The lack of a uniform and clear pleading standard introduces 
uncertainty at the earliest stage of the federal litigation process. 
Uncertainty raises costs in any system, and the federal court system is 
no different. Post-Twombly, federal courts must now deal with an 
increased workload, as there has been an increase in the filings of 
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.182 Moreover, parties are 
now forced to spend more time preparing a complaint, to state more 
facts without the benefit of pretrial discovery, and to perhaps even 
increase the length of their pleadings to preemptively fend off 
challenges under Iqbal. These reactions increase cost and also waste 
the most precious of judicial resources, time. Ironically, these costs 
are antithetical to the policy goals of making litigation less 
 
 181. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985), superseded by statute, Judicial 
Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 313(a), 104 Stat. 5089, 5114–15, as recognized 
in Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004). 
 182. See CECIL ET AL., supra note 15, at 21–22 (finding a general increase from 2006 to 2010 
in the rate of filings of motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim). 
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burdensome and freeing courts of meritless claims that were the main 
drivers of the Courts decision in Iqbal.183 
From a historical perspective, the uncertainty currently 
surrounding pleading standards returns us to a time when a plaintiff’s 
claims could be dismissed because the law was confusing and rife with 
technicalities.184 Plaintiffs may believe that they are relying on good 
law only to have their claims dismissed by a court that takes it upon 
itself to radically reinterpret valid Supreme Court precedent on 
pleading standards. Moreover, just as it was difficult to distinguish 
between “material facts,” evidentiary facts, and conclusions under 
Code pleading,185 it is also difficult to reliably identify what claims a 
court will find conclusory or plausible. Courts are supposed to 
vindicate rights, but if the esoteric debate over what facts are 
possible, plausible, or probable locks a plaintiff out of court, then 
citizens seeking their day in court will lose their faith in the judicial 
system. 
Quite simply, there is a guidance function to the rule of law and 
to fulfill it the Supreme Court should clarify pleading standards. The 
conflicting approaches taken by lower federal courts illustrate that 
judges are unsure over the proper pleading standard to apply. Five 
years have passed since Iqbal, and pleading standards have not 
worked themselves out. On the contrary, every day that passes seems 
to invite further judicial creation of ways to reconcile the tension in 
the Court’s pleading jurisprudence. This includes some courts 
accepting that invitation by effectively overruling two major Rule 8 
precedents. The issue is ripe for review. The recent McCleary-Evans 
case presents a clean issue for the court to decide once and for all if 
Leatherman and Swierkiewicz have been retired too. 
CONCLUSION 
Claims that “Conley has been overruled” or that “notice 
pleading is dead” spark exciting debates. But they are simply not true. 
Swierkiewicz and Leatherman went untouched by Twiqbal and have 
 
 183. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685–86 (2009) (“Litigation, though necessary to 
ensure that officials comply with the law, exacts heavy costs in terms of efficiency and 
expenditure of valuable time and resources . . . .”). 
 184. See supra notes 19–28 and accompanying text (discussing the technicalities of common-
law pleading). 
 185. See supra notes 29–34 and accompanying text (discussing the practical issues presented 
by Code pleading).  
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not officially earned their retirement. Yet, as this study has shown, 
some lower courts have deemed these pre-Twombly precedents to no 
longer be viable. Radically reinterpreting good law leaves litigants 
and their attorneys with the burdens accompanying uncertainty. 
As Judge Clark noted, paper pleadings cannot take the place of a 
trial on the merits.186 The goal of the draftsmen of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure was to create procedures that “most efficiently 
foster decisions on the merits.”187 The disagreement among lower 
courts about the continued vitality of pre-Twombly precedent 
presents the Supreme Court with an opportunity to revive this goal. 
 
 186. Clark, supra note 1, at 46. 
 187. Carter, supra note 35, at 2179. 
